Government Information Quarterly

The current executive order on security classification seeks to establish criteria and standards for classifying information, to set standards on the release of information, and to provide guidance for withholding national security information requested under the Freedom of Information Act. This tripartite effort is a fundamental mistake and one which has hindered efforts to reduce secrecy. This article discusses what the appropriate standards should be in each situation and suggests how these objectives might be accomplished, but recommends that the executive order on security classification be limited to its olignal function.

Prepared by
INFORMATION SECURITY OVERSIGHT OFFICE,
U.S. General Services Administration

This explanation of the development of E.O. 12356 originally appeared as an appendix to Annual Report to the President FY 1982 (Washington, D.C., 1983) bv the Information Security Oversight Office, U.S. General Services Admin- istration, Washington. D.C. 20405.

In the spring of 1983, President Reagan issued a National Security Decision Directive which, among other provisions, mandated that present and future Executive Branch employees and contractors having access to classified information or sensitive compartmented information, the latter being a kind of intelligence data, sign one of two types of nondisclosure agreement. Previously, these types of agreements had been used for the most part only in the intelligence agencies. This article reviews the law which has developed around the prepublication review requirement of Central Intelligence Agency agree-.ments and examines the contracts mandated by the new National Security Decision Directive, identifying issues raised by these agreements in light of the body of case law dealing with the C.I.A.'s system of censorship. With regard to the prepublication review requirement, the focus here is limited to former rather than current officials of the government.

Despite its critical importance to the nation, the information security or security classification system under every presidential administration since World War II has been subjected to criticism about its scope and purpose. In the past few years, the tension between access to government information and the protection of national security has increased. Today, the Information Security Oversight Office serves to help ease that tension. Through various oversight initiatives, it strives to limit the extraordinary protection of national security classification to only that very sensitive information that merits such shelter.

Security classification policy is generally established by the President through an executive order. Although Congress has no formally established oversight role on security classification issues, there has been fairly regular and systematic congressional oversight of security classification policy. However, the nature of the classification process makes it very difficult for Congress to monitor the way in which classification policy is applied in practice.

During the past few years, efforts have been underway to increase national security controls on scientific communication. In many regards, the situation is a repetition of a policy conflict that occurred with the onset of the Cold War almost forty years ago. The integrity of science will not be enhanced by increased national security controls on scientific communication. Designed to impede our adversaries in the international arena, such restrictions can severely curtail U.S. scientific achievement and progress, with consequential harm to the intellectual and economic, as well as military security of the nation. Both the historical background of this issue and the current controversy are explored here.